Social Assistance and Poverty Reduction During the New Communist Era by Verme, Paolo
Social Assistance and Poverty Reduction During the New
Communist Era
Paolo Verme1
May 2007
Abstract
The recent growth period in the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) has
been accompanied by a resurgence of populist policies managed by communist or post-
communist governments. Are these policies able to improve household welfare? The
paper moves beyond an incidence analysis to assess the impact of social assistance benets
on household welfare in Moldova between 2001 and 2004, the entire rst mandate of a
re-elected communist government. If we ignore standard issues of impact evaluations
such as selection bias, behavioral responses, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity,
an incidence analysis suggests that increased spending on social assistance enhances the
probability of moving out of poverty and reduces the probability of moving into poverty.
However, double di¤erence estimates based on a mimicked randomized experiment and
parametric estimates based on panel data which are able to control for at least some
of these factors indicate that social benets have not contributed to improve household
welfare or reduce poverty. Double di¤erence estimates point to a negative impact on
welfare. Parametric estimates do not evidence any consistent signicant impact on welfare
or poverty. We derive that the sharp growth in population coverage and expenditure on
cash benets that characterized social assistance policies in recent years has not resulted
in a signicant improvement in welfare, all other factors being equal.
JEL: H53; I32; I38; P35
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1 Introduction
The rst decade of the transition from Socialism to Capitalism has been very hard for the
countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). All the fteen Republics that constituted the
Union experienced a deep recession between 1990 and 1995 with an average fall in GDP
of about 40%. As they were starting to recover in 1996 and 1997, Russia defaulted on its
debt and unleashed a nancial crisis that reached all FSU republics with a subsequent new
fall in GDP of several percentage points. Hidden and open unemployment and poverty
increased consistently during the decade leading to a severe decline in living standards
(World Bank, 2005). Understandably, the populations of these countries have lived the
1990s as a painful experience that overshadowed the initial enthusiasm for reforms.
At the turn of the century, these sentiments translated into political opposition for
those governments that managed the reforms. In authoritarian states where the former
communists maintained power throughout the 1990s, political oppositions have been either
silenced by di¤erent degrees of force (Uzbekistan, Belorussia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
Russia) or emerged in the form of peaceful revolutions (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan).
In less authoritarian states where reforms have been managed by new reformist coalitions,
these changes occurred in the form of a resurgence of communist parties (Moldova, Lithua-
nia). Whatever the political process, fteen years into the transition period the former
communists still rmly control most of the political establishments across the FSU, an
outcome that very few could anticipate in 1991.
Incidentally, the same economic reforms despised by the populations that su¤ered the
immediate consequences of such reforms and the devaluation of the currencies occurred in
the aftermath of the 1998 nancial crisis created the pre-conditions for the new growth era
that emerged at the turn of the century. All FSU economies have been enjoying positive
and sustained growth rates since the year 2000 and the post-communist governments that
found themselves in power at the beginning of the new millennium now benet from a
favorable economic climate and from growing resources, including rising budget revenues.
This is also the story of Moldova, a small FSU republic that su¤ered severe economic
consequences following the desegregation of the Soviet Union, transitional reforms and the
1998 Russian nancial crisis. By 1999, Moldova had lost almost 60% of its GDP2 and had
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an estimated poverty rate (headcount index) of 71% (World Bank 2004). Dissatisfaction
with reformists governments led to the election of a communist party in 2001 with over
50% of the votes. During the rst mandate of this government, GDP grew on average by
7% a year (Government of Moldova, 2005) while it is estimated that poverty (headcount
index) declined from 54.6% in 2001 to 26.5% in 2004 (Government of Moldova, 2004).
Facilitated by improved budget revenues and in line with a communist agenda, the gov-
ernment increased public spending on social assistance managing to improve population
coverage very signicantly. If judged in terms of outputs such as GDP growth and poverty
reduction, the performance of the post-communist government has been remarkable and
the population of Moldova rewarded the government for such performance by conrming
it to power in March 2005 with 46% percent of the votes.3
Can poverty reduction be attributed to specic pro-poor government policies or is more
generally the product of economic growth?
This paper addresses this question by focusing on one policy instrument which is specif-
ically designed to support the poor and the vulnerable: social assistance benets in cash
(henceforth social benets). We carry out a welfare impact evaluation of social benets
using household panel data that cover the period 2001-2004, the entire rst mandate of
the communist government. The purpose is to try to isolate from other e¤ects the impact
of social benets (and their increase) on the welfare of Moldovan households and assess in
this way the merits of social assistance policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on
poverty and social assistance in transition. Section 3 looks more in detail at the Moldovan
case. Section 4 discusses some of the key issues we are confronted with in making a
retrospective impact evaluation. Section 5 outlines the evaluation strategy we opted for.
Section 6 illustrates data and variables used and section 7 discusses the results. Section 8
concludes.
2 Poverty and social assistance in transition
The social protection system in the FSU countries went through important changes during
the 1990s. The Soviet system did not really make a distinction between social insurance
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and social assistance. As all adults were expected to work and provided with the same
means, social protection was designed around the needs of the workforce or conned to
a set of pensionsgranted to citizens who were not able to work such as the disabled.
The transitional recession and the growth in unemployment and poverty changed this
scenario drastically and governments found themselves unequipped to deal with these new
challenges. With the support of international institutions, FSU countries embarked on
a program of social protection reforms. The distinction between social insurance and
social assistance became more important as the pension funds were made extra-budgetary
and the informal sectors were expanding quickly leaving large sections of the populations
unprotected. It became also necessary to shift from a categorical type of cash benets to
a means-tested system in order to focus attention on the real poor.
In many FSU republics social protection reforms are still largely uncompleted and
the evaluation of such reforms is in an early stage. In particular, reforms have largely
focussed on social insurance relegating social assistance to a backstage role which explains
the scarce attention of researchers to such instruments. We are not aware of any published
paper that conducted a welfare impact evaluation focussed on social assistance benets
in these countries. This is also explained by the fact that the household budget surveys
which are necessary to evaluate public transfers are still few and discontinuous.
There are, however, some studies that evaluated public transfers in transitional economies
combining social insurance and social assistance transfers. Milanovic (2000) looked at
social protection transfers in Latvia using one cross-section survey. He nds a weak pro-
poor role of social protection benets but does not distinguish between social insurance
and social assistance benets and provides an incidence rather than an impact evaluation.
Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) analyzed the role of the social safety net in protecting the
poor from the 1998 Russian nancial crisis. They use two spells of the Russian Longitu-
dinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and a rather broad denition of government transfers
that includes social assistance and social insurance. They conclude that the social safety
net in place was largely insu¢ cient to protect the poor from the Russian crisis.
Welfare impact evaluations of social assistance benets in other countries in transition
outside the FSU are also scarce. Ravallion et al. (1995) looked at the early years of the
transition in Hungary and focussed on the role of the social safety net in protecting people
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from poverty and promoting their escape from poverty. Combining social insurance and
social assistance benets, they found that the safety net was able to protect e¤ectively
from poverty but did not play an important role in lifting people out of poverty. Van de
Walle (2003) followed in the steps of this last paper to test the public safety net in Vietnam
and found a very marginal role of the social safety net in protecting people from poverty
or promoting an exit from poverty. Okrasa (1999a and 1999b) has used a four years
panel survey from Poland to assess the impact on poverty of the public safety net using
a survival analysis. The transfers considered are family allowances and unemployment
benets and the author nds a general positive impact on redistribution, a positive but
moderate impact on reducing the poverty spell and a positive impact on exiting poverty
with all these e¤ects being di¤erent depending on the household prototype considered.
The present study seems to be the rst to focus on the welfare impact of social as-
sistance benets in a transitional economy. The distinction between social assistance and
social insurance is not a trivial one for welfare evaluations. Social insurance relates to
the world of work and is designed to protect past and present workers from risk (old age,
disability, work injury, unemployment, maternity). Social insurance benets are granted
based on contributions and irrespective of welfare status. By contrast, social assistance
is specically designed to assist the poor and the vulnerable irrespective of whether they
have contributed to social insurance schemes or not. Only social assistance benets are
specically designed to alleviate poverty and for this reason they are a better candidate
for evaluating pro-poor government policies.
3 The case of Moldova
Moldova is one example of the changes occurred in the FSU during the 1990s with a deep
recession during the early part of the decade, two years of stability in 1996 and 1997 and a
new recession caused by the 1998 Russian nancial crisis. It is an extreme example in that
the fall in GDP (-60%) and the peak poverty level (71%) reached by 1999 are remarkable
gures even within the FSU scenario. Indeed, the case of Moldova can be listed as one of
the worst recessions of the twentieth century on record. But what can social assistance do
to help the poor and the vulnerable under such circumstances?
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Despite the growing needs, the social assistance system lagged behind in terms of
reforms. In the Soviet Union, the system did not distinguish between social insurance
and social assistance and welfare benets were characterized by an emphasis on special
categories of citizens such as the war veterans, children and the disabled. During the
1990s, the transitional recession and attempted reforms led to contrasting e¤ects. On
the one hand, reforms aimed at two major objectives including the separation of social
insurance from social assistance and the transition of social assistance from a categorical
to a means-tested system. The rst objective was principally designed to make social
insurance independent and extra-budgetary. The second objective aimed at focussing
scarce resources on the poor. On the other hand, nancial resources were quickly shrinking
because of the recession preventing these same reforms from being implemented. By the
end of the 1990s, the government of Moldova had substantially reduced the number and
size of social assistance benets and had also accumulated a certain amount of arrears in
payments without really implementing structural changes.
Economic recovery started in the year 2000 and GDP growth continued at a sustained
level between 2000 and 2005 with annual growth rates in between 5% and 8%. By 2004,
poverty had signicantly recovered to a level below the pre-1998 Russian nancial crisis
and estimated at 26.5% of the population (Government of Moldova, 2004). The beginning
of the growth period almost coincided with the election of the communist government
in 2001 and the concomitance of growth and a communist agenda contributed to change
the fortunes of the social assistance system. Between 2000 and 2005, all social assistance
benets increased in number, size or coverage with growth rates in real expenditure ranging
from 6% to 335%. Benets continued to be mainly targeted to the war veterans, disabled
and children and these three categories of beneciaries together increased in size between
2001 and 2004 to reach about 90% of all beneciaries and total expenditure. By 2005,
the social assistance benets system included nine di¤erent types of benets and had a
total expenditure estimated at 1.7% of GDP and 4.6% of public expenditure (World Bank,
2007).
The stated aim of social assistance benets in Moldova is to assist the poor and the
vulnerable. According to the Social Report 2001 prepared by the former Ministry of
Labour and Social Protection, social assistance benets and facilities: (. . . ) are provided
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to persons that nd themselves at risk or are unable to make for their living. (. . . ) Social
assistance objective is to support persons who temporarily or continuously face di¢ culties
which impedes them to obtain necessary conditions for a decent life, helping them to develop
their own capacities and competencies for a relevant social functioning."(Government of
Moldova, 2001, p.9, English version).
Yet, the practice of social assistance has continued to be biased in favour of selected
categories of beneciaries irrespective of wealth status and, to date, none of the benets are
really means tested.4 The Government of Moldova had plans to experiment with means-
tested benets and a few categorical benets were complemented with means-tests but -
de facto - all social assistance benets continued to be granted according to categorical
criteria. The government of Moldova may have been successful in targeting its political
constituencies. But has it really addressed its stated intentions of improving welfare?
4 Key issues
We are confronted with a retrospective evaluation. There was no design to evaluate social
assistance benets before the program was launched and we cannot rely on a randomized
experiment and/or household surveys which were specically designed for evaluating social
assistance benets. This is the rule rather than the exception in transitional economies.
These countries face nancial and skills constrains which limit the funds and capacities to
undertake a proper evaluation design.
The social program we are evaluating is expected to be a¤ected by most problems
which are typical of evaluations of this kind including selection bias and lack of a proper
comparison group, unobserved heterogeneity, model endogeneity and measurement error.
Selection bias accrues from the fact that the group of households that received social
benets - the treated group - was not randomly selected by the government. This group
may be very di¤erent in terms of its characteristics from the group of households that
did not receive social benets - the untreated group - which is therefore a poor choice of
counterfactual.
Several factors which determine program selection are not observed in our data and
some of the observed factors are likely to be plagued by endogeneity and measurement
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error. Participation to the program depends from the application decision on the part
of the household and from the selection decision on the part of the government. On
the household decision, we do not have any information about whether the household has
applied for benets or not. On the government decision, we know that benets are assigned
to predetermined categories of citizens such as children, the disabled and the war veterans
but we cannot identify from the survey the exact categories that correspond to each benet.
For example, we do not know the category of disability or the war veteran status. Nor, we
can distinguish those variables that determine the household decision from those variables
that determine the government decision. For example, having many children may be a
factor that induces households to apply for benets because poor households tend to have
many children but is also a categorical criteria used by the government to assign benets.
The social benets program also su¤ers from mismanagement and not all benets are
assigned to those who are supposed to be targeted. Disability status is a gatekeeper for
a whole range of benets and it is widely recognized in Moldova that the commission
that grants disability status is not su¢ ciently transparent in its decisional process. Endo-
geneity may arise due to the fact that some of the unobserved criteria used for program
selection may be correlated with observed variables. Also, the proxy-means tests in place
for two of the existing benets are only subsequent to the categorical criteria and result in
signicant targeting error type I (non coverage of poor people) and targeting error type II
(coverage of rich people). Again, these are not exceptional circumstances for an evaluation
of government transfers in transitional economies but the rule.
In substance, program selection is not entirely deterministic but contains several sources
of stochasticity. The social assistance scheme has also expanded during the period con-
sidered and this has occurred in concomitance with output growth and poverty reduction
which means that we also need to disentangle the impact of social assistance transfers
from the impact of growth.
5 Evaluation strategy
Our objective is to evaluate the impact of social benets on household welfare and poverty.
We dispose of four consecutive rounds of a household budget survey (2001-2004) that cover
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income and consumption and which measures the social assistance benets received by
households (more on the survey in the data and variables section). We also know that the
social benets program was already on-going in our period one and expanded throughout
the four years period considered.
Let i be our unit of interest - the household - with i = 1; 2; :::n; t an indicator of
time with t = 1; 2; 3; 4; Pi a binary variable that describes whether households participate
(Pi = 1) or do not participate (Pi = 0) to the social benets program; Bi a variable
that measures the intensity of total benets received by each household with Bi = 0 if
the household does not receive benets and 0 < Bi  Bmax if the household receives
benets; and Yi a variable representing household welfare with 0 < Yi  Ymax. We will use
the notation 0T 0 to identify the group treated with social benets and 0C 0 to identify the
comparison group.5 With t = 1; 2, we can identify four groups of households (A;B;C;D)
according to participation Pi as follows:
Group P1 P2
A 0 0
B 0 1
C 1 0
D 1 1
We call group A Stayouts, group B Joiners, group C Leaversand group D Stayins.
Our primary interest is the comparison of groups A and B over the period given that we
are trying to assess the impact of accrued benets. However, comparing C and D can also
provide a useful counterfactual. For example, Ravallion et Al. (2005) study the impact on
welfare of falling out of the Trabajar workfare program in Argentina therefore focussing
on groups C and D.
We propose a three-steps evaluation process. The rst step consists in estimating the
transition probabilities between di¤erent welfare groups over time. The advantage of this
approach is that is very versatile and provides a set of useful informations which can be
used for at least four di¤erent exercises: 1) An assessment of the upward and downward
mobility of households across welfare groups and time; 2) An assessment of the role of
social benets in fostering or hampering such mobility; 3) Two separate tests that assess
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the ability of social benets to protect the non-poor from falling into poverty (PROT) and
to promote the poor to exit poverty (PROM); 4) A poverty incidence evaluation.
For the rst exercise it is su¢ cient to read the transition probability matrix between
two time periods in the presence of benets. This will tell us about household mobility
across welfare groups. For the second exercise and if we estimate the transition probability
matrix also in the absence of social benets, we can use the percentage of households in
each cell of the transition matrices to measure changes in probabilities with and without
benets. A similar procedure can be used to calculate the PROT and PROM tests. These
tests have been developed by Ravallion et Al. (1995) and used in other works since (see
for example van de Walle, 2003). Simplifying the exposition, let Ft (z) be the share of the
poor at time t in the presence of social benets and given a poverty line z and let Gt (z)
be the corresponding share in the absence of social benets. Let also F (z; z) and G (z; z)
be the shares of those who stay poor between the time periods considered. The protection
(PROT) and promotion (PROM) tests are dened as:
PROT (z) = G2(z) G (z; z)  F2 (z) + F (z; z) (1)
PROM(z) = G (z; z)  F (z; z) 6 (2)
Positive values of these measures will indicate that social benets have been able to
protect the non-poor from poverty and promote the poor out of poverty. Using the same
two transition matrices (in the presence and absence of social benets) we can estimate
the incidence of social benets on poverty and on di¤erent welfare groups. To estimate the
incidence on poverty, it is su¢ cient to read the columns totals and compare these gures
in the estimates with and without benets.
These are useful informations but we constrained the analysis to the sphere of incidence
evaluations where the comparison group is simply the population in the absence of social
benets. We havent really constructed yet a proper comparison group able to deliver an
impact evaluation.
For this purpose, the second step will be to mimic a randomized experiment and then
use a double di¤erence (DD) or di¤erence in di¤erencemethod to estimate the impact
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of benets on welfare. In our two years scheme, groups A and B did not participate to
the program in time 1 while in time 2 only group B participates. If group A and B were
identical in all respects in time 1 then the social benets program could be considered as
randomly assigned. In our data, group A happens to be very large while groups B, C and
D are smaller (the coverage of benets is low). With propensity score matching we can
extract from group A in time 1 the nearest match to group B in time 1. We can then
compare changes in welfare of the two groups during the period with the double di¤erence
method as follows:
DAB = [E(Y
T
i2 )  E(Y Ti1 )]  [E(Y Ci2 )  E(Y Ci1 )] (3)
where E(Yi) is the expected value (the mean) of welfare. Positive values of DAB will
indicate that social benets had a signicant impact on welfare.
The DD estimator is generally used to address the problem of endogenous placement
that arises from single di¤erence estimators. The aim is to compare participants and
non participants pre and post intervention.7 Such procedure generally entails a program
start in period 2 and a selection bias which is time-invariant. If this is the case, the DD
estimator is unbiased and the program impact is correctly estimated (Ravallion 2006). In
our case, we can relax the time-invariant assumption given that we do not use group A as
a comparison group but a match of group B extracted from group A. One problem may
instead arise from the fact that we need to use the panel component of the surveys rather
than the two full cross-section surveys.8 We need to trace the same households between
period 1 and 2. This implies a certain attrition resulting in a loss of observations and a
possible loss of sample representativeness. This potential loss will be assessed by testing
means equality of the balanced and unbalanced panels.
The third step will be to exploit the availability of a four years period for a longitudinal
parametric analysis. We regress the intensity of benets (conditional on a number of other
variables) on a measure of welfare and the social benets status (conditional on a number
of variables) on the poverty status as follows:
yit = i + Bit + Xit + it (4)
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Poorit = i + Pit + Xit + it (5)
where i, ,  are parameters, it is the error term, Poorit is a binary variable with
1 = Poor and 0 = Non_Poor, yit is a continuous measure of welfare (described in the
next section), Bit is a continuous measure of benets (described in the next section), Pit
represents program participation and i and t stand respectively for units of observation
and time. We call [4] the welfare equation and [5] the poverty equation. The advantage
of this approach is that we can exploit the ability of longitudinal models to treat non-
observed time-variant and time-invariant factors under various assumptions and address
the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity.
The choice of panel models estimators is extremely rich. We opted to use Fixed e¤ects
(FE), Between E¤ects (BE) and Random E¤ects (RE) models addressing separately the
question of consistency of results across specications with di¤erent sets of regressors and
the question of consistency of results across these three models (more on the variables
used in the next section).9 To check for results consistency across models specied with
di¤erent sets of regressors we use the RE model as this the only one that can accommodate
all types of variables including time-invariant and unit invariant variables. Equation [4] is
estimated with a GLS estimator while equation [5] is estimated with a probit. The GLS
specication is as follows:
RE : (yit   yi ) = (1  )+
 
xit   xi

 + [(1  ) i + (it   i )] (6)
where y is the welfare variable and y is its mean,  is an arbitrary function of 2v and
2 ,  is the intercept,  is the slope parameter of the regressors which is assumed to be
xed across observations,  is the unit-specic residual and  is the error term with i and
t standing for units of observations and time respectively.
In a second stage we addressed the question of results consistency across di¤erent
estimation models by comparing the three models FE, BE and RE. The within and between
e¤ects models are specied as follows:
FE : yit   yi + y = + (xit   xi + x) + (it   i + ) +  (7)
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BE : yi = + x

i + i + i (8)
with:
it  IID
 
0; 2

; 8 i 2 N; t 2 T
yi =
PTi
t=1 yit=Ti; y
 =
P
i
P
t yit=nTi;
xi =
PTi
t=1 xit=Ti; x
 =
P
i
P
t xit=nTi;
i =
PTi
t=1 it=Ti; 
 =
P
i
P
t it=nTi
With a xed (within) e¤ects model the problem of time constant unobserved hetero-
geneity is addressed but the model uses information only on the moverswasting infor-
mation on the stayers. The FE model also assumes that the independent variables and
the idiosyncratic error term are independent. In reality and in our case such endogeneity
may arise from systematic shocks due to macroeconomic factors such as growth (period
e¤ect), omitted variables such as those variables that explain program selection and are
not observed, shocks that can also a¤ect regressors such as changes in growth that may
lead to changes in labor market conditions (simultaneity) and measurement error which
we know we have. Autocorrelation in the disturbance term may also be an issue as people
who have already successfully applied for benets may apply again or simply continue to
be granted benets with no further enquiry10.
We can address period e¤ects by introducing time dummies in the xed (within) ef-
fects model and this partly addresses simultaneity and we can also estimate a within
e¤ects model with auto-regressive disturbance term. We opted instead to use macroeco-
nomic variables which identify the macroeconomic shocks that occurred during the period
considered. We know that between 2001 and 2004 Moldova enjoyed sustained growth
and that employment has improved during the period. We can use the growth and the
employment rates as regressors in place of time dummies and check the impact of these
shocks on the social benets parameter.
In conclusion, the RE model is an obliged choice for comparing models with all forms
of regressors. The FE model with the macroeconomic variables is probably the best choice
to address issues of unobserved heterogeneity, period e¤ects and simultaneity but it drops
time invariant regressors. The BE model is less relevant but is a useful counterfactual to
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the FE model which is a within e¤ects model and focuses on time invariant e¤ects.
6 Data and variables
Data are taken from the 2001-2004 Moldova Household Budget Survey (MHBS). The
survey covers approximately 6,240 households every year interviewed in monthly blocks
of about 520 households each. It includes a panel component with an elaborate rotation
scheme and a maximum tenure of each household of four years.11 The survey is a multi-
stage sampling and multi-purpose survey and includes sections on income and consumption
as well as sections on labour, health and others. In the data used for this paper, a balanced
panel includes 2,469 households over two years and 866 over the four years period. A
balanced panel includes only observations included in the panel by design.
As a measure of welfare we use real monthly consumption per capita divided by the
poverty line (y). This is a rather standard approach in similar studies (Ravallion et Al.,
1995, van de Walle, 2003). Consumption is expected to be a better measure of welfare
than income given that income is underreported and is more sensitive than consumption
to seasonal variations. We use real consumption measured at 2001 prices. The poverty line
is the one adopted by the Government of Moldova in 2001 which was 195 Lei (Government
of Moldova, 2004). The poverty line was calculated with a cost of basic needs approach
based on a food basked of 2,100 calories/day and an extra amount calculated for non food
items. The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) equivalent value of the 2001 poverty line was
approximately 2.5 USD/Day which is what the World Bank considers as an appropriate
poverty line for transitional economies (World Bank, 2005). We opted to ignore equivalence
scales. This is the approach followed by the World Bank in its study on poverty in Moldova
(World Bank, 2004) and is also justied by the arbitrary nature of equivalence scales and
by the fact that results are often very sensitive to the type of equivalence scale used.12
Nine types of benets are considered: Utilities compensations, child allowances, war
veterans allowances, social allowances, death grants, Chernobyl compensations, care-taker
allowances for the disabled, transport compensations for the disabled and material as-
sistance. Utilities compensations, child benets, war veterans allowances and social al-
lowances account for the quasi-totality of benets captured by the surveys. These benets
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are all allocated monthly and the aggregated variable (B) has been transformed in real
and per capita terms and relative to the poverty line so as to be comparable with the
welfare indicator (y).
We use four groups of conditional variables to which we attach di¤erent economic
interpretations. The rst group of variables (a) are the characteristics of the household
head including age, sex and education. These are standard variables which are generally
known to be relevant for household welfare. The second group (b) are variables indicating
di¤erent levels of household dependency from active individuals including the number
of children and the number of household members relatively to the number of earners
in the household. These variables are expected to be correlated with welfare and also
with the probability of receiving benets but they are not dropped by the software for
multicollinearity and the correlation coe¢ cient with the social benets variables are rather
low. The third set of variables (c) includes those variables that are time-invariant but
may be relevant for welfare including rural location and whether the household has been
interviewed in the summer months or not. Rural areas are known to be poorer and welfare
is generally subject to seasonal variations. The fourth group of variables (d) includes two
macroeconomic variables which are expected to capture macroeconomic shocks. One is
the growth rate which is cross-section invariant and one is the district employment rate
which is dened as the average district number of earners divided by the number of adults
in the district as captured by the survey. This last variable varies over time and across
districts. Means of all variables used in the regressions are reported in table A1 in annex
for the four years and for the balanced and unbalanced panels.
7 Results
Social assistance benets in Moldova are pro-poor, meaning that the greatest share of
these benets is allocated to households with monthly consumption per capita below the
poverty line. However, between 2001 and 2004 the share of social benets received by the
rst quintile (the poorest 20% of households) has declined signicantly from 57.6% of total
benets to 49.2%. Redistribution has occurred in favour of the second and third quintiles
while the top two quintiles maintained a at and non insignicant share of around 10% of
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total expenditure each (Figure 1).
[Figure 1 here]
Living conditions have improved very signicantly between 2001 and 2004. Average
consumption relatively to the poverty line (y) has increased from 1.05 in 2001 to 1.53 in
2004 and the poverty headcount ratio has declined from 62.6% to 34.1%.13 The average
benet relatively to the poverty line (B) for benets recipients has instead declined between
2001 and 2004 from 0.16 to 0.14. However, this decline has been accompanied by a
remarkable growth in coverage (from 5.7% to 19%) which explains the growth of average
benets per capita in the population (Table 1). The government clearly opted to increase
expenditure and coverage rather than focussing on proper targeting based on means tests
and the ne tuning of individual transfers.
[Table 1 here]
Estimates of the transition probability matrices would suggest a positive incidence of
social benets on poverty. Table 2 reports the transition probabilities between poor and
non poor. The rst two columns in table 3 report the di¤erence between these probabilities
estimated with and without benets. Positive values indicate an increased probability of
moving across poverty groups in the presence of social benets and vice-versa for negative
values. To check for consistency, we repeated the estimations using the balanced and
unbalanced four years panels and also the balanced panels for the three periods 2001-
2002, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004. We can see that the values for the transition from poor
to non-poor (P-NP) are all positive while the values for the transition from non poor to
poor (NP-P) are all negative.
The PROT and PROM tests proposed by Ravallion (1995) conrm these ndings with
positive values for both PROT and PROM for all estimates (table 3, columns 3 and 4).14
The poverty headocount index in the presence of social benets is also lower than in the
absence of benets for all estimates (table 3, column 5). In substance, the presence of
social benets enhances the probability of moving from poor to non-poor and reduces
the probability of moving from non-poor to poor. As already mentioned, the problem
with this procedure is that we ignore the issue of the reference group using the untreated
individuals as comparison group unconditional on household characteristics.
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[Table 2 and 3 here]
The double di¤erence estimates with matched samples provide a rather di¤erent pic-
ture. Table 4 reports the relevant statistics for each group and the respective match over
each of the three periods considered. When we compare those who joined the social ben-
ets scheme (group B) with a matched sample extracted from those who did not join
(group A) we nd that all DD estimates are negative. This indicates that joining the
scheme did not improve welfare for the treated everything else being equal. As a counter-
factual, we estimated the DD measures comparing those who left the scheme (group C)
with a matched sample extracted from those who continue to stay in the scheme (group
D). Leaving the scheme seems to improve welfare everything else being equal. From these
estimates, social benets seem to have a negative e¤ect on welfare.
The disadvantage of the double di¤erence approach as we designed it is that we con-
strain the sample to a rather small number. This is due to the fact that coverage is initially
low and that the treated group is small. On the other hand, if the matched sample is valid,
estimates should be consistent and close to a randomized experiment.
Also, double di¤erence estimates and a randomized experiment can miss on some of
the behavioral e¤ects that may arise from unobserved heterogeneity such as di¤erences
in households abilities. During a period of sharp growth such as the one we observe,
those who prot from and contribute to growth are probably the most skilled, with better
contacts and social abilities, all attributes which are di¢ cult to measure in household
surveys. This motivates the third step in our analysis where we use longitudinal data to
control for unobserved heterogeneity.
[Table 4 here]
Tables 5a and 5b report random e¤ects estimates using all sixteen possible specica-
tions and the balanced and unbalanced panels.15 Table 5a illustrates results for the welfare
equations and 5b for the poverty equations. For simplicity of exposition, we report only
the coe¢ cients and the z statistics for the variables of interest (B and P ). With a bal-
anced panel (top panel in table 5a), B is signicant with a positive sign in equations 2, 6,
9 and 13. In all these equations, the macroeconomic variables (district employment rate
and annual growth - d) are omitted which would suggest that once we control for growth
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social benets do not inuence welfare. This same statement is not true if we consider the
unbalanced panel. In twelve of the sixteen welfare equations B is signicant, including
four equations where the macroeconomic variables are present (table 5a).
Similar results are found with the poverty equations (table 5b). With the balanced
panel, P is signicant in equations 2, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 16. In all these equations the
macroeconomic variables are omitted. When we control for the economic cycle, the sig-
nicance of social benets disappears. However, with the unbalanced panel, in eight of
the sixteen poverty equations P is signicant including four equations where the macro-
economic variables are present (table 5b). Therefore, the unbalanced panel would suggest
that the economic cycle is not su¢ cient to explain improvements in welfare and that social
benets may play a role.
[Table 5a and 5b here]
Tables 5a and 5b used a random e¤ects model. In order to test di¤erent estimation
models, we have to exclude the time-invariant variables (rural and summer) which are not
supported by the xed e¤ects model. Table 6a and 6b report the results for the balanced
and unbalanced panel estimations and include the three estimation models considered (FE,
RE and BE). As before, the exercise is repeated for the welfare and poverty equations.
With the balanced panel estimations (table 6a), none of the social assistance variables is
signicant in either the welfare or poverty equations. With the unbalanced panel (table
6b) the social assistance variables are signicant in equations 2, 3 and 4. Again, the
di¤erence is between balanced and unbalanced panel with the balanced panel suggesting
no e¤ect of social benets and the unbalanced panel suggesting some e¤ect.
The balanced panel is more appropriate to assess the impact of benets provided that
the attrition rate, which is very large over the four years, does not bias the sample. Table
A1 in annex reports the means for all variables and the t-test for means di¤erences between
balanced and unbalanced panels. The di¤erence in means is generally rather small and
below 10% across variables with most variables showing a gap below 20%. The t-test
shows a signicant di¤erence between the balanced and unbalanced panels only for the
rural and summer variables. In particular, for the variables of main interest (y, poor, B
and P) the di¤erence in means is never very signicant. Moreover, the unbalanced panel
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largely pollutetime e¤ects with incomplete spells which is a serious shortcoming if annual
macroeconomic shocks are responsible for explaining most of the variation in welfare which
seems to be our case.
The Hausman tests reported on the bottom of table 6a and 6b speak also in favour of
the FE model rather than the RE model and in the FE model used with the unbalanced
panel the intensity of benets variable (B) is not signicant. In substance, when we use
the most appropriate model (FE), the most appropriate sample (balanced) and when we
control for macroeconomic trends social assistance does not seem to have any positive and
signicant e¤ect on welfare or poverty.
[Table 6a and 6b here]
8 Conclusion
Between 2001 and 2004, Moldova has experienced sustained growth and poverty reduction.
The arrival to power of a communist government has also reinstated the old system of so-
cial assistance where the focus was on selected categories of beneciaries including mainly
children, the disabled and the war veterans and where cash benets were granted irrespec-
tive of welfare status. Relative expenditure on the bottom quintile and expenditure per
beneciary have decreased during the period in favour of increased overall expenditure
and a sharp rise in population coverage.
This populistapproach does not seem to have improved household welfare, all other
factors being equal. If we ignore the questions of selection bias, behavioral responses, un-
observed heterogeneity, endogeneity and measurement errors, an incidence analysis would
suggest that social benets enhance the probability of moving out of poverty and reduce
the probability of moving into poverty. However, double di¤erence estimates and regres-
sion analyses which are able to control for at least some of these factors would suggest
that social benets have not contributed to improve welfare overall. Double di¤erence es-
timates show a negative impact on welfare perhaps explained by unobserved heterogeneity
in abilities to exploit growth opportunities. Panel survey estimates do not evidence any
consistent signicance of social assistance benets in explaining welfare or poverty and
point instead toward a strong growth e¤ect.
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Notes
1Department of Economics "S. Cognetti de Martis", University of Torino and School of Management
SDA-Bocconi, Milan
2See http://www.cisstat.com/eng/mac-01.htm
3http://www.elections2005.md/
4Benets for children in age 0-3 and material assistance are supposed to be accompanied by means-tests
but in reality the system pre-selects categories of beneciaries making the means-test an almost redundant
exercise.
5Note that the comparison group is not necessarily the group of non treated households observed in the
data. The latter can be one of the possible choices of comparison groups and - as already explained - not
a good choice for our specic case.
6The promotion test would be PROM(z) = F1(z)  F (z; z) G1 (z) +G (z; z) but given that F1(z) =
G1 (z) by denition (in the pre-benets period F (z) cannot include benets) the equation is reduced to
PROM(z) = G (z; z)  F (z; z)
7DD evaluations are very popular in all sciences. A frequently cited reference of a DD evaluation
for developing countries is Duo (2001) while Lokshin and Yemstov (2003) provide an example of DD
applications to transitional economies.
8Note that the standard DD approach does not require a panel structure (Ravallion 2006).
9We excluded the pooled OLS because this estimator would provide bias estimates given that we expect
signicant endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity. We also excluded dummy variable regressions
(LSDV) because this is practical only when N is small and Instrumental Variables (IV) models because
they rely on assumptions about the instrument that cannot be tested. Dynamic panel models were excluded
because they would require IV specications to be unbiased. A conditional xed-e¤ects logit model was
also excluded because it drops observations where the treatment variable does not change over time.
In our data, these are groups A and D which would mean wasting most of the dataset. Among error
components models we opted to use both FE and RE models. A RE model assumes no covariance between
the explanatory variables and the error term that represents person specic and time invariant unobserved
heterogeneity. This would be a rather unrealstic assumption. In a country like Moldova, unobserved factors
such as individual contacts matter a great deal for nding a job or accessing cash benets. However, this
model has the advantage of accomodating all types of regressors including time invariant and cross-section
invariant regressors. This is important because we want to test the model conditional on variables such as
rural location or the season when the interview took place which would be dropped in a FE model.
10As already mentioned, some of the factors that determine the decision to apply are likely to be non
observed in the data.
11Signoret, J.E. (2003) provides full details on the panel structure and rotation mechanisms.
12For example, in a study on poverty (GoM 2004), the Government of Moldova uses an equivalence scale
of 1 for the rst adult in the household, 0.7 for the other adults and 0.5 for children below the age of 16.
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The poverty estimations provided by this study are very di¤erent from the estimations provided by the
World Bank (2004) for the same years.
13The poverty trends indicated here di¤er from those reported in poverty studies on Moldova (GoM
2005 and World Bank 2004). This is explained by the adoption of di¤erent deators for the consumption
gures and by the use or non use of equivalence scales.
14Note that columns 1 and 4 in table 3 report the same values. That is because the PROM test is
reduced to the di¤erence of the transition probabilities between estimates with and without benets.
15By all possible specicationswe mean inserting and omitting all groups of variables a; b; c and d one
at the time.
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Figure 1 - Social Benets by Consumption Quintiles
23
2001 2002 2003 2004
Obs 6214 6159 6123 6121
Popul. 3,630,500 3,623,991 3,553,774 3,603,873
Mean 1.044 1.271 1.509 1.534
Std. Dev. 0.876 1.005 1.160 1.225
Obs 356 876 1115 1166
Popul. 269,759 586,764 731,134 813,745
Mean 0.162 0.167 0.164 0.143
Std. Dev. 0.281 0.311 0.267 0.195
Obs 6217 6159 6123 6121
Popul. 3,632,407 3,623,991 3,553,774 3,603,873
Mean 0.012 0.027 0.034 0.032
Std. Dev. 0.087 0.139 0.138 0.110
Benefits coverage 5.7 14.2 18.2 19.0
Poverty headcount 62.6 48.5 34.8 34.1
Coverage and poverty
Average consumption relative to PL (y)
Average benefits relative to PL for all (B)
Average benefits relative to PL for benefits receipients (B)
Table 1 - Household Welfare and Social Benets
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Poor Non poor Total Poor Non poor Total
Poor 55.0 45.0 100 Poor 56.4 43.7 100
Non poor 17.8 82.3 100 Non poor 19.5 80.5 100
Total 34.2 65.8 100 Total 36.4 63.6 100
Poor Non poor Total Poor Non poor Total
Poor 56.4 43.6 100 Poor 57.6 42.5 100
Non poor 17.0 83.0 100 Non poor 19.6 80.4 100
Total 33.8 66.2 100 Total 36.4 63.6 100
Poor Non poor Total Poor Non poor Total
Poor 56.0 44.0 100 Poor 57.4 42.6 100
Non poor 19.9 80.1 100 Non poor 22.5 77.5 100
Total 40.9 59.1 100 Total 42.9 57.1 100
Poor Non poor Total Poor Non poor Total
Poor 48.4 51.6 100 Poor 49.8 50.3 100
Non poor 16.5 83.5 100 Non poor 17.8 82.2 100
Total 30.8 69.2 100 Total 32.8 67.2 100
Poor Non poor Total Poor Non poor Total
Poor 60.0 40.0 100 Poor 61.5 38.6 100
Non poor 17.1 82.9 100 Non poor 18.7 81.3 100
Total 29.7 70.3 100 Total 32.2 67.8 100
Balanced panel 2001-2002
Balanced panel 2002-2003
Balanced panel 2003-2004
With benefits Without benefits
Unbalanced panel 4 years
Balanced panel 4 years
Table 2 - Transition Probabilities Matrices
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1 2 3 4 5
Diff. Trans. Prob.
P-NP
Diff. Trans. Prob.
NP-P PROT PROM Pov. Incid.
Unbalanced panel 4 years 1.38 -1.79 0.82 1.38 -2.2
Balanced panel 4 years 1.14 -2.59 1.47 1.14 -2.61
Balanced panel 2001-2002 1.32 -2.56 0.74 1.32 -2.06
Balanced panel 2002-2003 1.37 -1.29 0.61 1.37 -1.98
Balanced panel 2003-2004 1.45 -1.54 1.05 1.45 -2.5
Table 3 - Social Benets Incidence
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Group Obs Popul. Mean y Std. Dev. DD
2001-2002 2002 group B 259 165,757 1.168 0.888 -0.031
2002 match B 259 145,524 1.186 0.964
2001 group B 259 160,209 0.968 0.778
2001 match B 259 141,009 0.955 0.775
2002-2003 2003 group B 146 99,830 1.223 1.051 -0.073
2003 match B 146 75,934 1.357 0.868
2002 group B 146 88,335 1.051 0.823
2002 match B 146 74,734 1.111 0.689
2003-2004 2004 group B 145 113,299 1.433 0.863 -0.148
2004 match B 145 83,425 1.538 1.484
2003 group B 145 94,748 1.473 0.985
2003 match B 145 84,450 1.430 1.112
2001-2002 2002 group C 39 32,707 1.289 0.977 0.578
2002 match C 39 35,919 0.966 0.619
2001 group C 39 37,366 0.818 0.455
2001 match C 39 33,766 1.073 1.053
2002-2003 2003 group C 58 40,889 1.400 1.201 0.210
2003 match C 58 41,066 1.218 0.749
2002 group C 58 48,179 1.030 0.557
2002 match C 58 41,213 1.058 0.544
2003-2004 2004 group C 87 58,151 1.313 1.322 0.010
2004 match C 87 59,642 1.266 0.778
2003 group C 87 64,179 1.252 1.360
2003 match C 87 60,905 1.215 0.672
Joiners (B)  Vs. Stayouts (A) match of B
Leavers (C)  Vs. Stayins (D) match of C
Table 4 - Double Di¤erence Estimates
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
y=B+a+b+c+d y=B+a+b+c y=B+a+b+d y=B+a+c+d y=B+b+c+d y=B+a+b y=B+a+c y=B+a+d
0.135 0.229 0.138 0.102 0.147 0.233 0.185 0.104
-1.41 (2.33)* -1.44 -1.05 -1.52 (2.36)* -1.86 -1.07
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
y=B+b+c y=B+b+d y=B+c+d y=B+a y=B+b y=B+c y=B+d y=B
0.24 0.148 0.115 0.187 0.241 0.194 0.114 0.194
(2.42)* -1.52 -1.17 -1.89 (2.43)* -1.94 -1.16 -1.94
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
y=B+a+b+c+d y=B+a+b+c y=B+a+b+d y=B+a+c+d y=B+b+c+d y=B+a+b y=B+a+c y=B+a+d
0.103 0.183 0.103 0.074 0.108 0.183 0.155 0.074
(2.24)* (3.93)** (2.24)* -1.59 (2.32)* (3.92)** (3.28)** -1.58
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
y=B+b+c y=B+b+d y=B+c+d y=B+a y=B+b y=B+c y=B+d y=B
0.183 0.106 0.08 0.155 0.181 0.144 0.075 0.141
(3.85)** (2.26)* -1.69 (3.29)** (3.81)** (3.03)** -1.59 (2.96)**
Balanced panel
Unbalanced panel
Table 5a - Random E¤ects (GLS) Welfare Regressions with Di¤erent Sets of Regressors
Legenda: z-stat under coe¢ cients; (*) Signicant at 5%; (**) Signicant at 1%; y =
Real cons./Pov. Line; B = Real Soc. Ben./Pov. line; a=hfem, hage30_45, hage46_60,
hage60plus, hprim, hsec, htert; b=nchildm dep3_4, dep5plus; c=rural, summer; d=terremprate,
growth.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Poor=P+a+b+c+d Poor=P+a+b+c Poor=P+a+b+d Poor=P+a+c+d Poor=P+b+c+d Poor=P+a+b Poor=P+a+c Poor=P+a+d
-0.132 -0.336 -0.152 0.078 -0.156 -0.354 -0.174 0.06
-1.35 (3.66)** -1.54 -0.82 -1.58 (3.83)** -1.96 -0.62
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Poor=P+b+c Poor=P+b+d Poor=P+c+d Poor=P+a Poor=P+b Poor=P+c Poor=P+d Poor=P
-0.352 -0.169 0.073 -0.19 -0.364 -0.195 0.061 -0.205
(3.83)** -1.71 -0.76 (2.12)* (3.95)** (2.19)* -0.64 (2.30)*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Poor=P+a+b+c+d Poor=P+a+b+c Poor=P+a+b+d Poor=P+a+c+d Poor=P+b+c+d Poor=P+a+b Poor=P+a+c Poor=P+a+d
-0.012 -0.16 -0.023 0.181 -0.01 -0.168 0.005 0.172
-0.35 (4.67)** -0.66 (5.16)** -0.27 (4.89)** -0.14 (4.92)**
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Poor=P+b+c Poor=P+b+d Poor=P+c+d Poor=P+a Poor=P+b Poor=P+c Poor=P+d Poor=P
-0.147 -0.01 0.19 0 -0.148 -0.011 0.194 -0.007
(4.27)** -0.27 (5.40)** -0.01 (4.30)** -0.34 (5.53)** -0.22
Unbalanced panel
Balanced panel
Table 5b - Random E¤ects (Probit) Poverty regressions with Di¤erent Sets of Regressors
Legenda: z-stat under coe¢ cients; (*) Signicant at 5%; (**) Signicant at 1%; poor
(1=poor; 0=Non poor); P (1= soc. ben. Recipient; 0=Others); a=hfem, hage30_45,
hage46_60, hage60plus, hprim, hsec, htert; b=nchildm dep3_4, dep5plus; c=rural, sum-
mer; d=terremprate, growth.
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Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dep. Var. y y y poor poor poor
Model fe re be fe re be
b/sbd 0.136 0.138 0.173 -0.056 -0.033 0.001
-1.3 -1.44 -0.7 -1.95 -1.39 -0.03
hfem 0.179 0.134 0.017 -0.062 -0.03 0.012
(3.05)** (3.07)** -0.25 (2.05)* -1.51 -0.45
hage30_45 0.019 -0.116 -0.345 -0.104 -0.012 0.092
-0.19 -1.42 (2.45)* (2.00)* -0.31 -1.59
hage46_60 0.065 -0.119 -0.413 -0.138 -0.017 0.086
-0.57 -1.4 (3.07)** (2.35)* -0.44 -1.55
hage60plus 0.028 -0.232 -0.616 -0.117 0.036 0.178
-0.23 (2.40)* (3.66)** -1.8 -0.78 (2.56)*
hprim 0.181 0.17 0.15 -0.06 -0.084 -0.089
-0.99 -1.47 -1.01 -0.63 -1.64 -1.46
hsec 0.168 0.18 0.12 -0.144 -0.091 -0.044
-0.98 -1.67 -0.86 -1.63 -1.91 -0.77
htert 0.529 0.833 1.027 -0.25 -0.26 -0.265
(2.60)** (6.50)** (6.21)** (2.37)* (4.56)** (3.89)**
nchild -0.213 -0.252 -0.353 0.13 0.131 0.138
(5.50)** (8.59)** (6.89)** (6.49)** (9.49)** (6.41)**
dep3_4 -0.152 -0.098 0.194 0.061 0.042 0
(2.05)* -1.46 -1.2 -1.61 -1.28 -0.01
dep5plus 0.069 0.18 0.63 -0.056 -0.127 -0.303
-0.6 -1.81 (3.04)** -0.95 (2.64)** (3.52)**
terremprate 0.217 0.36 0.799 -0.051 -0.141 -0.304
-1.85 (3.49)** (3.58)** -0.84 (2.78)** (3.23)**
growth 4.953 5.049 26.627 -2.977 -3.095 1.122
(12.39)** (12.67)** -0.26 (14.12)** (14.88)** -0.03
Constant -4.116 -4.153 -26.924 3.782 3.817 -0.638
(8.86)** (9.30)** -0.25 (15.55)** (16.65)** -0.01
Observations 3463 3463 3463 3463 3463 3463
Number of hhid 866 866 866 866 866 866
R-squared 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.14
Hausman test (fe/re)
Chi2 36.74 26.71
Prob>chi2 0.0005 0.0136
Table 6a - Regressions with Di¤erent Estimators - Balanced Panel
z-stat or t-stat under coe¢ cients
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Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dep. Var. y y y poor poor poor
Model fe re be fe re be
b/sbd 0.038 0.103 0.144 -0.053 -0.007 0.005
-0.52 (2.24)* (2.39)* (2.74)** -0.74 -0.48
hfem 0.118 0.108 0.095 -0.017 -0.03 -0.031
(2.88)** (6.77)** (5.45)** -0.86 (4.53)** (4.33)**
hage30_45 -0.008 -0.351 -0.419 0.005 0.042 0.044
-0.12 (12.10)** (13.05)** -0.16 (3.46)** (3.40)**
hage46_60 -0.085 -0.441 -0.506 -0.018 0.07 0.076
-1.07 (15.14)** (15.96)** -0.47 (5.84)** (5.92)**
hage60plus -0.094 -0.586 -0.675 0.022 0.09 0.088
-1.04 (17.12)** (17.88)** -0.49 (6.37)** (5.80)**
hprim 0.253 0.152 0.138 -0.129 -0.092 -0.088
(2.09)* (3.69)** (3.11)** (2.18)* (5.44)** (4.91)**
hsec 0.161 0.162 0.154 -0.126 -0.071 -0.067
-1.33 (4.20)** (3.73)** (2.12)* (4.52)** (4.04)**
htert 0.446 0.766 0.786 -0.205 -0.258 -0.261
(3.09)** (17.62)** (17.06)** (2.91)** (14.59)** (14.07)**
nchild -0.23 -0.293 -0.312 0.153 0.138 0.138
(7.97)** (25.18)** (23.76)** (10.80)** (28.26)** (25.81)**
dep3_4 -0.086 0.006 0.063 0.02 -0.002 -0.013
-1.68 -0.23 -1.85 -0.77 -0.13 -0.92
dep5plus 0.068 0.239 0.314 -0.067 -0.095 -0.099
-0.83 (5.73)** (6.44)** -1.66 (5.42)** (5.01)**
terremprate 0.132 0.297 0.357 -0.06 -0.12 -0.129
-1.55 (6.83)** (7.00)** -1.43 (6.49)** (6.22)**
growth 4.353 5.022 5.751 -2.409 -2.994 -3.35
(16.14)** (25.80)** (20.71)** (17.95)** (34.10)** (29.69)**
Constant -3.286 -3.771 -4.516 3.038 3.609 3.984
(10.34)** (17.60)** (14.95)** (19.34)** (37.66)** (32.57)**
Observations 24597 24597 24597 24597 24597 24597
Number of hhid 18011 18011 18011 18011 18011 18011
R-squared 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.12
Hausman test (fe/re)
Chi2 93.53 57.62
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6b - Regressions with Di¤erent Estimators - Unbalanced Panel
z-stat or t-stat under coe¢ cients
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